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INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CON-
TRACTS.
The enforcement of contracts either by giving damages at law
for their non-performance, or by decreeing their specific perform-
ance in equity, requires their proper interpretation and construc-
tion. By the former is understood the act of finding out the true
sense of the words embraced in the contract, so as to enable others
to derive from them the same idea which the contracting parties
intended to convey. The latter relate rather to the drawing of
conclusions concerning subjects lying beyond the direct expressions
contained in the instrument; or to such as are fairly within its
spirit, although not within its letter. The great object of both is
to arrive at the intention of the parties by a fair construction of
the words which they have made use of in mutually binding each
other to the performance or omission of certain acts or things,
which they have attempted to specify in their agreement. To
facilitate this the more readily, the law, through the medium of
Courts of justice, has devised certain rules of interpretation and
construction, which are not merely conventional rules, but are the
canons by which all writings are to be construed, and the meaning
and intention of men to be ascertained. These rules cr canons of
construction are to be applied with consistency and uniformity.
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In them are found the aids or assistants resorted to both by .Courts
of law and equity in the administration of justice. Our purpose
will be simply to call attention to a few of the most important of
these aids in which will be found embraced the canons of construc-
tion. Of these there are two principal sources.
First. The consideration of that which is embraced Within the
instrument which embodies the contract.
Second. That which lies outside of the instrument, but which is
accessible for the purpose of modifying its terms, and giving it
proper effect.
First. In regard to the first, parties may so draw their contracts
as to leave little, if anything, to interpretation or construction.
Whenever they clearly express their intention, that will prevail,
although they may have been unfortunate in the terms selected for
that purpose. Even where terms are omitted they will be sup-
plied if the intention clearly calls for them : as in Bache vs. -Proc-
tor, 1 Doug. 382, where the condition of a bond of £2000 was to
"c render a fair, just, and perfect account in writing of all sums re-
ceived." The Court held the condition broken by a 'neglect on
the part of the obligor to pay over such sums. See also -Doe vs.
Spry, 1 B. & Ald. 617.
Where the terms of a promise admit of more senses than one,
the question will naturally arise as to what is the rulh or criterion
to be adopted in the performance of it. The law here adopts the
rule of ethics as laid down by Paley, viz., that - the promise is to
be performed in that sense in which the promissor apprehended, at
the time, that the promissee received it." Gunni'on Ys. Bancroft,
11 Vermont 493.
Of those rules of construction that are so well settled as to have
passed into canons, we may enumerate the following.
1. Whatever sense may be adopted, the construction must be
reasonable. To apply this rule properly, it may sometimes become
.necessary to consider the subject-matter of the agreement. Ex-
pressions that may be susceptible of two'meanings must be taken
in that which best agrees with the matter of the contract. In
Guier vs. Page, 4 Serg. & Rawle 1, a sale made for " approved
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indorsed paper" was held to mean paper which ought to be
approved. In Jones vs. Shears, 7 C. & P. 346, a. tenant agrees to
work a colliery so lon( as it is ,fairly workable." Although
there were still coals in the mine, but of such a description that it
would not pay to work it, it was held that the tenant was not
obliged to work the mine at a dead loss. -The ultimate limit be-
yond which no latitude of construction can be carried is that the
words and language of the instrument will bear the sense sought
to be put upon them.
2. The construction shall be liberal; that is, the terms of the
agreement shall be construed according to their most comprehen-
sive, popular sense, provided there be nothing in it to show that
they were intended to be used in a more confined interpretation.
Packard vs. Hill, 7 Cow. 434. An indefinite expression shall be
understood universally unless there be otherwise some reason to
restrain it. Thus, in the Year Book, 19 Hen. 6, 41, two persons
having goods in jointure give all their goods. Held, that this
passes not only the goods they have in jointure, but also their
several goods.
3. The construction shall be favorable-that is, it shall be of
such a character as that the agreement, if practicable, shall be
supported. Every presumption shall be in favor of the validity of
a contract, and Courts will, if possible, so construe its terms as to
give it some operation. Hence, words which are susceptible of
two senses, one agreeable to, the other against the law, shall have
given to them the former sense. Thus, in Harrington vs. IMloP-
rogge, 4 Doug. 5, a bond is given conditioned to assign all offices.
Held to apply only to such offices as are by law assignable. A
stipulation, by a particular construction, would be frivolous and
ineffectual, but by a contrary exposition, though in itself less ap-
propriate, a different effect would be produced; the latter irnterpre-
tation shall be adopted. Pugh vs. Duke of Leeds, Cowper 714.
4. The popular meaning of words shall be adopted; that is, the
terms of a contract are to be understood and taken in their plain,
ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have, in respect to the
subject-inatter, acquired a particular sense, distinct from the popu-
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lar one of the same words; or unless by a reference to the context,
it is manifest that in the particular instance they were understood
by the parties in some other special sense. Lord -Dormer vs. Knight,
1 Taunt. 417.
5. The whole of the agreement must be carefully considered.
Courts are required to give a construction to the entire instrument,
and although the difficulty may lie in a single clause, yet, in giving
a construction to that, the context should be carefully examined,
and the whole agreement referred to. The principle is to give,
if possible, effect to every part of the instrument. Any sweeping
clause contained in it is made to take effect only as to estates and
things of the same nature and description as those that have been
previously mentioned. Moore vs. llagruth, Cowper 9. The re-
cital contained in an instrument is always important as indicating
clearly the minds of the parties as to what is really the subject-
matter of their agreement. That which is contained in a bond is
resorted to for the purpose of limiting its condition. Liverpool
Waterworks vs. Atkinson, 6 East 507. So, also, may a recital be
examined to ascertain the meaning of the parties; and the general
words of a clause or stipulation may be explained or qualified by
the matter recited. Payler vs. ilomersham, 4 M. & Selw. 423.
A recital may even amount to an agreement where it is to be
called into action to discover and give effect to the obvious mean-
ing of the parties, provided it is plain, from the whole tenor of the
instrument, that the parties mutually contemplated and intended
that the matter or act should be performed. Samson vs. Easterby,
9 B. & C. 505. Words introduced by way of exception may be
so construed as to constitute an agreement. Duke of St. Albans
vs. Ellis, 16 East 352. The principle extends further, and creates
a contract out of words put into a clause which is introduced as a
proviso or condition, if there is sufficient to show that the parties
contemplated an agreement that the particular act mentioned in
the clause should be done. Balder vs. Taylor, Brownlow 23. A
lessee covenants to repair, "provided always, and it is agreed,
that the lessor shall find timber, &c." Held, a contract to find
the timber, &c.
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Where there are exceptions, the rule of construction is, to allow
them to control the instrument so far as the words of them extend
and no farther; dnd whenever the case is taken out of the letter
of the exception, the instrument is left to operate in full force.
6. The contract shall be taken most strongly against the con-
tractor. The same principle applies to an exception which may
occur in a lease or other instrument, and which being the words
of the lessor, are to be construed against him and favorably to
the lessee. This canon of construction, however, is subordinate to
all the general principles of exposition of contracts. It is the
last to be resorted to, and is never relied upon, but where other
rules of construction fail. Even then it is subject to two condi-
tions :
(1.) That there be an ambiguity in the instrument.
(2.) That there be an inability to collect the apparent intention
of the parties from the whole context of the instrument. If the
contract be so ambiguous that no meaning can be abstracted from
it with any degree of moral certainty, it shall be treated as void;
and further, this canon has no application given to it where a harsh
construction would work a wrong to a third person. But where
the language of the instrument is neither uncertain nor ambiguous,
it is to be expounded according to its apparent import, and wherever
the words are clear and definite, they must be understood accord-
ing to their grammatical construction, and in their ordinary mean-
ing: -Doe d. Oxenden vs. Chichester, 4 Dow. P. 0. 65.
7. When the intent of the parties to a contract is manifestly
paramount to the manner chosen to effect it, if it cannot operate
in the mode intended, it may operate in such mode as will legally
effiect the intention. Roe vs. Tranmer, 2 Wils. 75, holding that a
deed intended to operate as a lease and release, and which in that
form is void, may be construed as a covenant to stand sgised to
uses, and be thereby rendered operative.
8. Where one portion of - contract is wholly repugnant to the
rest of it, and irreconcilable with the manifest intention of the
parties, as apparent upon a consideration of the whole instrument,
it will be stricken out, and effect will be given to the contract
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without it. Thus if a thing be granted generally, but is accom
panied with a proviso which annuls the grant, the proviso Vill be
treated as a nullity: Cleaveland vs. Smith, 2 Story 287. When
a general and indeterminate stipulation occurs in a previous part
of a contract, and a limitation is given to it by a subsequent clause,
effect should be given to both clauses, the office of the latter being
to qualify and limit the former; but if the subsequent stipulation
contradict what was previously distinctly stated, and which consti-
tuted a principal inducement to the contract, it will be wholly
rejected in giving effect to the contract.
9. It occasionally occurs in the descriptive words made use of
in contracts and conveyances of land, that the courses, distances,
admeasurement, and ideal lines described, conflict with the well
known and fixed monuments, either natural or artificial, which are
referred to in the instrument As marking out and determining its
boundaries. In such case it is the latter which control and de-
termine the rights of the parties: Cleaveland vs. Smith, 2 Story
279.
10. It also sometimes occurs that by the terms of the contract
an election is given to either party of one of two several things,
and in such case it becomes necessary to determine from the in-
strument which is the party to do the first act, because to such
party belongs the election. One party conveys to .another two
acres of land, one for life and the other in fee. The grantee,
who is the party to take possession, has the election to take either
the one or the other in fee. But if the party otherwise entitled
to it, by his own wrong or default lose his election, it then belongs
to the other party. One party, for instance, is bound'in the alter-
native, to do one of two things by a certain day, and fails to do
either; the right to elect as to which shall be done, then passes to
the other "party: ._cNitt vs. Clark, 7 John. 465. In some cases
the mere omission of the party having the election, to perform one
of the alternatives, will of itself have the effect of transferring the
election to the other: Price vs. Nixon, 5 Taunt. 338.
11. The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion qf
another. The proper limitation here is, that the thing thus im-
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 135
pliedly excluded must be of the same kind or class with that which
is expressed. This canon is often invoked to silence all claims
upon implied contracts when there are express ones relating to the
same matter; as where a lease contains an express covenant on
the part of the tenant to repair, there can be no implied contract
to that effect arising out of the relation of landlord and tenant.
Second. Although the general rule is to interpret and construe
an instrument by what appears upon its face, yet the instances
are of frequent occurrence where reference is had to matters
dehors, or without it, in order to give it complete effect, or more
fully to carry out the intentions of the parties. In reference to
this the law has a general maxim that "that is sufficiently certain
which can be made certain." This, however, can only be con-
sidered as correct within certain limitations. These limitations
refer not so much to the means as to the boundaries within which
the law permits that to be rendered certain which the parties in
their written contract have left uncertain. As a general illustra-
tion (f this canon, tle case of Oven vs. Thomas, 3 Mylne & Keen
353, may be referred to. An agreement in writing for the sale
of a house failed to give any description of it by which it could
be identified, but referred to the deeds describing it as being in
the possession of A. lB., named in the agreement. The Court
held this to be sufficient within the principle of this canon. This
rule or canon is perhaps of sufficient breadth to include all that
can possibly arise within this second class of cases. We shall
therefore proceed to indicate some of the most important cases
which arise under this general maxim, and which furnish instances
of its special application.
1. The first we shall mention is where there is another'or other
written instrument or instruments referred to by the one which is
offered for construction. The general rule is,-where several deeds
are made at one time, to effect one object, they will be construed
as one assurance ; but so that each shall have its direct operation
to carry on the main design. Lawrence vs. Blatefiord, 2 Verm.
457. Even where two are executed on different ,nyis. but relate
to the same subject-matter, thc latter referring to and being based
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upon the former, the two are to be reaa together and the general
words contained in the last are to be restricted so as to conform
to the intention of the parties, as derived from an examination of
both instruments. Coddington vs. Davis, 1 Comst. 186. The
Court will even presume such priority in the execution of instru-
ments as will best effect the intention of the parties. Newhall vs.
JVright, 3 Mass. 138. A case in which the effect of construing
one instrument with another, and the qualifying effect had by one
upon the other, are much discussed, is one in the Court of Errors
of the state of New York-Rogers vs. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114.
The canon of construction under which these cases may be more
specially included, is, that " words to which reference is made in
an instrument have the same effect and operation as if they were
,inserted in the clause referring to them."
2. Another large class of cases are constaintly presenting the
problem, how far and under what circumstances parol evidence is
admissible to affect the terms of a written instrument. The
general principle is, that where there is no ambiguity in the terms
employed, the instrument itself, being the only criterion of the
intention of the parties, has the effect of excluding parol evidence
contradicting the writing, although such parol testimony would
clearly ohow the real intention of the parties at variance with the
particular expression of the written agreement. Williams vs.
Jones, 5 B. & C. 108. Where such instrument appears on the
face of it to be complete, parol evidence is never admissible to
contradict it. The only thing, therefore, that will justify the
admission of such evidence is the existence of ambiguity. And
this is of two kinds-patent and latent. The* former is that
which is apparent on the face of the instrument itself. Wherever
this exists no parol evidence is admissible to clear it up. If
parties have left their written contract so dubious on the face of
it as to be equally capable of several different constructions and
applications, although a clear definite meaning might be given to
it by means of extrinsic oral evidence, yet it would then be the
oral evidence, and not the writing, that would produce the definite
effect; and hence it is excluded.
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A latent ambiguity never appears upon the face of'the instru-
ment, but arises merely upon its application. The maxim here
is, that "latent ambiguity may be supplied by evidence; for an
ambiguity which arises by proof of an extrinsic fact, may, in the
same manner, be removed." The carrying out of this canon of
construction violates no legal principle. It only points the appli-
cation to this or that subject-matter, and never seeks to usurp the
authority of the written instrument. It performs the humbler
task of acting in aid and assistance of the written instrument, by
pointing out and connecting it with its proper subject-matter.
1l1urley vs. HeDermott, 3 Nev. & Per. 356. A very satisfactory
test as to whether any given case comes within this principle or
not is to determine whether the ambiguity itself is raised by facts
extrinsic of the instrument; because it is only when so raised that
parol evidence is admissible to explain it. For instance, there is
a grant or devise of the manor of A. Parol evidence shows two
manors of that name belonging to the grantor or devisor. And
as parol evidence has raised the ambiguity, and created the obsta-
cle to the enforcement of the grant or devise, the law allows a
resort to the same species of testimony to clear it up and to show
which of the two manors was intended as the subject of the grant
or devise. It is not, perhaps, too much to say that parol evidence
is admissible to some extent to determine the application of every
written instrument. It must be resorted to to show what it is that
corresponds with the description, and it must be allowed to extend
to all such extrinsic facts as determine the application of the
instrument to one subject, rather than to others, to which, on the
face of it, it might appear equally applicable.
3. Ancatier branch of inquiry relates to what acts of the parties.
and what circumstances, it is admissible to produce in evidence in
order to explain a latent ambiguity. The law admits evidence to
be given of all the acts of the parties that were previous to, or con,
temporaneous with, the agreement, but not of those that were sub-
sequent. JAit no parol evidence can be received to add to a written
agreement aay stipulation orally agreed upon between the parties
eith:er before or at the time the contract was reduced to writing,
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and which was to be parcel of the written instrument, but was not
introduced into it. Lord Irnham vs. Cdild, 1 Bro. Chan. Rep. 92;
Small vs. Quincy, 4 Greenl. 497. But a different rule prevails in
regard to introducing evidence of such stipulations subsequent to
the execution of the written agreement. Brewster vs. Gcountryman,
12 Wend. 446. It is held entirely competent, in all cases not
affected by the Statute of Frauds, after the agreement has been
reduced to writing; and after breach, for the parties to it to make
a new contract, not in writing, by which they agree to waive, dis-
solve, or annul the former agreement, or add to, subtract from,
vary, or qualify the terms of it, and thus to make a new contract,
to be proved in part by the written agreement, and in part by the
subsequent verbal stipulations. In all those cases where the written
contract is not intended, and does not in fact purport to contain
all the terms of the agreement, it is competent to introduce evi-
dence of a distinct contract resting in parol, and which relates to
terms not noticed in the written memorandum. Jeffry vs. Walt, 1
Stark. 267. And so also collateral terms may be ingrafted by
parol, upon an agreement in writing, which is entirely silent on
the subject of such terms, if the new matter be supported by some
known custom or general understanding.
In regard to time and circumstances, the rule is, that "the best
and surest mode of expounding an instrument is by referring it to
the time when, and circumstances under which,' it was made."
Ancient grants are to be expounded according to the law of the
time when they were made. Adams vs. Prothinghlam, 3 Mass.
352. So also the rule may be considered as fully established, that
however general the words of an ancient grant 'may be, it is to be
construed by evidence of the manner in which the thing granted
has always been possessed and used, as this furnishes evidence of
the intention of the parties. Weld vs. ffornly, 7 East 199.
In reference to circumstances, the Court will resort to those
which are extrinsic, and which surround the transaction, so as to
be, as nearly as possible, in the same situation as the parties whose
language is to be construed; and with this view it is proper to look
at all surrounding circumstances and the pre-existing relation be-
